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Law has an extremely complicated relationship with 
history. In particular, claims to legal legitimacy often 
base themselves on an argument that a particular legal 
position can be found in earlier sources, in a sense 
sanctified by the passing of time. This is particularly the 
case in areas of legal uncertainty, or areas lacking a 
statutory basis, where the occasionally Delphic 
utterances of judges are particularly important. Where 
an act of the legislature explicitly repeals an earlier act 
on a topic, and replaces it with new legal rules, the fact 
of the change is pretty clear. Where a range of judges 
over – at times – a number of centuries have 
contributed to a body of law, it is much less easy to 
establish whether a particular moment is one of change, 
clarification, or reassertion of the law.  
I want to take this as a starting point for my discussion 
of Revestment. History recognises, and some critics 
would claim overemphasises, the possibility of change 
over time. Law has strong drivers for emphasising 
continuity, even at the cost of retrofitting historically 
specific legal moments to match a contemporary 
understanding of law. In relation to law, the historic 
present tense is often in play. 
An example of this, which is not only directly relevant 
to our understanding of Revestment, but also ties in 
with a major commemoration of another legal 
landmark in the Atlantic Archipelago, is Magna Carta. 
Magna Carta had a surprisingly significant role in the 
early constitutional thinking of the rebel colonists in the 
American Revolution.1 Initially, the conflict between 
the colonies and Great Britain was phrased as the 
colonists vindicating their legal rights within the 
Imperial system. Only after constitutional arguments 
went against the colonists did they switch to a more 
assertive defence of their right to independence. Two 
banknotes issued by the Massachusetts Bay Colony 
exemplify this. The first was issued in December 1775. 
The note was designed by Paul Revere, a leading figure 
in the Revolution, and issued after the first military 
casualties in the Revolution, the creation of a 
Continental Army, and a declaration by the Crown that 
the colonies were in a state of ‘open and avowed 
rebellion’; but before the Declaration of Independence 
in July 1776. The note is ‘issued in defence of American 
liberty’, and depicts a colonial soldier holding a sword 
in one hand, and the Magna Carta in the other. The 
motto translates as ‘By the sword we seek peace, but 
peace only under liberty’. Even at this point, a 
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significant strand in revolutionary thinking was that 
they were legally in the right, as a matter of British law. 
A reissue of the banknote, after the Declaration of 
Independence, replaced ‘Magna Carta’ with 
‘Independence’.  
The principal constitutional debate was one of direct 
relevance to the context of Revestment. The Revolution 
can, with considerable fairness, be seen as a conflict as 
to the authority of Parliament in possessions of the 
Crown beyond Great Britain. The revolutionaries 
argued that Parliament had no authority, particularly in 
relation to taxation; the British government argued that 
Parliament had the power to make law for possessions, 
even those with representative legislatures of their own, 
for all matters. Both parties used legal documents and 
commentary dating back as far as Magna Carta, 
frequently the same documents and commentary, to 
support their understanding of the current law in the 
late eighteenth century.  Flaherty has convincingly 
argued that the key constitutional moment in the 
evolution of the doctrine of the authority of Parliament 
in all realms was in the early eighteenth century, when 
between 1717 and 1720 the Irish and British House of 
Lords clashed over appellate jurisdiction.2 The balance 
of academic opinion is, perhaps, that British law was 
against the colonists and in favour of the ultimate 
sovereignty of Parliament throughout the dominions of 
the Crown; but that the novelty of the doctrines upon 
which this finding depended strengthened the 
Revolutionary case to be vindicating ancient rights.3  
So, lawyers use history in interesting ways; and around 
the time of Revestment the legal authority of 
Parliament over non-British territory of the Crown was 
the subject of intense constitutional disagreement. Let 
me bring the focus back on Revestment, and in 
particular the legal transfer of the regalities. There are 
four ways of understanding this legal moment, and 
these different understandings are of more than 
theoretical importance. 
(1) The UK Crown usurped constitutional 
authority over the Isle of Man. It had not 
previously exercised statutory authority in any 
meaningful way over the Island, and the 
Revestment Act was beyond the authority of 
Parliament, and of no legal effect. Unlike the 
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American colonists, there was no realistic 
chance of successfully resisting this 
usurpation. The legal change was acquiesced 
to, but lacked legitimacy, and legitimacy was 
not to be gained by the simple passage of time. 
On this view, no Act of Parliament has any 
effect in the Manx legal order. 
(2) The UK Crown usurped constitutional 
authority in this way, but the acceptance of the 
usurpation in the Isle of Man over a prolonged 
period, marks a change in the fundamental 
legal order of Mann – what Kelsen called a 
grundnorm change.4 Claiming that the legal 
system should recognise the pre-Revestment 
status quo as the legitimate law is as useful in 
contemporary terms as holding to Franz, Duke 
of Bavaria, the descendant of James II, as 
United Kingdom Sovereign in preference to 
the more conventional line established by the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688.  On this view, 
although the origins are dubious, Acts of 
Parliament have legal authority in the Island. 
The dubious way in which the authority was 
required, however, is relevant to the 
negotiation of constitutional authority 
between Manx and British organs of 
government. 
Sybil Sharpe argues for the illegitimacy of 
Revestment, with an element of both of these 
understandings in her work.5 A difficulty with her 
argument is that we must discard a considerable 
volume of legal authority as illegitimate, rather 
than as evidence that Parliament had, and was 
understood to have, constitutional authority over 
the Isle of Man. It is fair to say that the affairs of the 
Isle of Man were of limited interest to England 
until the eighteenth century; but on areas that were 
of interest, we can find legislation and state action. 
My personal favourite is the decisive role of the 
English state in determining the identity of the 
Lord of Mann,6 but another commentator has 
preferred a 1541 Act of Parliament dealing with 
ecclesiastical matters of Chester and Man – both 
coming within what Gumbley categorised as that 
body of legislation dealing with ‘matters of state.7 
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(3) The UK Crown exercised its legitimate 
authority as Sovereign to extinguish the 
Lordship of Mann. From 1399 the Isle of Man 
was a conquered territory of the English 
Crown, which gave Parliament unfettered 
lawmaking power. For a number of centuries 
government, and so also law-making, was 
granted to the Lord of Mann. Revestment 
consisted of the surrender of the estate of the 
royal Lord of Mann, and the extinguishment 
of the Lordship as a bundle of rights against 
the Crown. The Crown chose to continue the 
former Lords’ concessions to Tynwald, on 
policy rather than constitutional grounds. The 
view is argued for by Augur Pearce.8 Augur’s 
important contribution to this debate gives 
much less emphasis to how Revestment has 
been seen, and much more to what he 
describes as ‘basic rules of feudal tenure’, in 
particular seeing Revestment as surrender of 
the Lord’s estate, and ‘the result of a surrender 
is merger’, so that ‘the superior lord cannot be 
said to “hold his vassal’s [subordinate] estate”. 
What he holds is his own estate ... freed from 
an encumbrance.’ His view is, however, 
incompatible with a considerable volume of 
statute, case-law, and constitutional practice. 
He contends that this is simply mistaken. 
(4) The UK Crown exercised its legitimate 
authority in 1765 to take over the regalities of 
the Lord of Man, adding them to its authority 
as Sovereign, or overlord. After Revestment, 
we can see a pattern of Parliament being much 
more active in legislation for the Isle of Man, 
but this was not the exercise of a new power. 
Rather it was a result of the UK having a direct 
interest in the governance of the Isle of Man, 
and no interest in respecting the interests of a 
feudal estate holder to exercise their own 
regalities. When the UK Crown exercised 
powers, and used mechanisms, formerly used 
by the Lord, however, they acted as Lord of 
Man. This is my position, which falls 
somewhat between that of Sharpe and Pearce, 
but I think is more compatible with the legal 
sources and constitutional practice. 
This is obviously interesting, but is it important? I think 
it is, and I can demonstrate this by a landmark case in 
the development of the Manx constitution: Re C.B. 
Radio.9 
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Re C.B. Radio is, on its facts, a prosaic enough case. The 
Attorney General sought to condemn goods seized by 
customs officials. The import prohibition was made by 
a Manx authority, under an Act of Tynwald, and the 
owners argued that this Act was void due to conflict 
with an Act of Parliament, and an Order made under 
such an Act. The Attorney General took a conservative 
approach to winning the case, arguing that the Manx 
legislation was not in conflict with either the Act or the 
Order. Hytner JA resolved the case rather more 
radically, building on an earlier decision where he had 
suggested that Parliamentary authority was based on 
‘delegation’ from the sovereign as Lord of Mann.10 He 
said: 
[the appellant’s advocate] postulated the 
difficulties which would arise if neither 
legislature were supreme and there was a clear 
conflict between an Act of Parliament and an 
Act of Tynwald. We can, however, see no 
difficulty at all as long as the Lord of Man 
remains the same person as the United 
Kingdom Sovereign. Since her consent is 
required before Acts of either legislature 
become law, it must follow that the later Act 
(whether of Tynwald or of Parliament) must 
prevail ... Nor can we accept that any conflict 
exists between the legislation passed at 
Westminster and that passed in the Island. 
Hytner JA in Re C.B. Radio claims, in the common 
judicial manner, to simply be stating the law as it 
always was. It is, however, unthinkable that his view of 
the co-ordinate jurisdiction of Tynwald and Parliament 
would have been enunciated before the Second World 
War. As well as a wealth of cases and constitutional 
examples in the nineteenth century, in Re Robinson, 
decided in 1936, Deemster Farrant observed that if an 
Act of Parliament did extend to the Isle of Man, 
Tynwald could not effect any limitation or alteration of 
the application of the Act to the Island.   
In that sense, then, Re C.B. Radio is a decision of its time, 
embedded in a context of increasing constitutional 
autonomy for the Isle of Man, and decreasing interest 
and activity by Parliament and UK government. I have 
argued elsewhere that its theory of Parliamentary 
sovereignty, and its understanding of Royal authority 
within both the UK and Manx constitutions, is seriously 
flawed.11 It is, however, striking that since this decision 
Tynwald has legislated in such a way as to clearly 
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repeal or amend Acts of Parliament as they apply to the 
Island. A later case has accepted the theory in Re C.B. 
Radio without adding to it.12 The coordinate jurisdiction 
of Tynwald and Mann, based by Hytner JA on the 
continued existence of Sovereign and Lord in the same 
person is a constitutional fact, albeit one subject to a 
further resolution by the courts or some other 
constitutional process. It is a fact that depends upon a 
particular understanding of Revestment.  
I will add a final, perhaps provocative, note on the 
significance of how we see Revestment. The Succession 
to the Crown Act 2013, an Act of Parliament, changes 
the rules for succession to the Crown, most notably in 
providing that in the future, the eldest child, rather than 
the eldest son, will inherit the Crown. As noted during 
the preparation of the Act, the Act will by necessary 
implication extend to the Isle of Man. Tynwald 
recognised this, with the decision to amend the 
Criminal Code 1872 to recognise female heirs’ apparent 
to the Crown being made on the basis of the 2013 Act 
changing succession.13  If the Revestment was an 
extinction of the Lordship of Mann, then the Act 
resolves the future Head of State for the Isle of Man. 
There is no Lordship to be inherited, and the Act 
changes succession to the Crown. If, on the other hand, 
the Lordship survives in the same natural person as the 
Crown, as Re C.B. Radio indicates, we could quite easily 
have the situation where, apart from the 2013 Act, a 
younger son would inherit in preference to his elder 
sister. In relation to the Crown, the 2013 Act makes it 
clear the daughter would inherit. But would the son be 
entitled to become Lord of Mann? Jersey tackled this 
head on, with their 2013 Law beginning ‘Whereas Her 
Majesty is Sovereign of the Bailiwick of Jersey, such 
Realm being anciently part of the Duchy of Normandy’, 
and ensuring that succession matches UK law.14 The 
Council of Ministers decided not to introduce similar 
Manx legislation.15 If our current understanding of 
Revestment requires us to take the idea of a surviving 
Lordship seriously, then separate inheritance of the two 
would seem to follow. A more likely outcome, perhaps, 
is that our understanding of what happened in 1765 
will – again – change to match current constitutional 
realities. 
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